

set of multicultural practices. Both multiculturalism and community cohesion reify ethnicity as leading to culturally distinct and separate groups with little to say about justice. What differs is their attitude toward their desirability.

Within this context, there has been limited debate in the academic and practice-planning community about the ways in which the planning system, through its "social conservatism," has served to reflect and reinforce existing patterns of social and racial disadvantages (Krishnarayan and Thomas 1993). Thus, new approaches to public engagement appear to target ethnic groups as distinct and separate communities that make it difficult to forge broad visions for the city or use the process to bring together disparate groups. Such approaches in urban policymaking continue to promote the idea that ethnic minorities experience advantage at the expense of the White majority (McGhee 2006).

The new British approach of community cohesion has led to a starling raft of policy prescription and concern with minority groups within the United Kingdom. However, it does not signal a fundamental shift within British approaches to ethnic diversity in the United Kingdom.

Although measures to enhance representation are part of an approach that values the multicultural city, this can only be part of a process. A pressing concern is trying to understand how practically we can weave together the potential of the city as a place for self-expression with the lived reality of many minority groups. This reality is of a policy process that embodies a colonial attitude toward BAME groups as still "immigrants" rather than British citizens. These implicit power relations expressed through community cohesion policies ensure the multicultural city in policy is palatable to the majority population. Urban planning's implementation of that vision, even if it does gather the viewpoints of a cross-section of the community, will reflect these parameters.

This chapter has argued that community cohesion is a continuation of a legacy of policymaking that stigmatizes ethnic minorities. It may not explicitly exclude such groups from political process as in the immediate postwar period but it fails to recognize the possibility of a British identity that is not White. Therefore, efforts to articulate shared community visions for multicultural cities will be hindered unless there is a clear political dimension of equality for ethnic and racial minorities in the United Kingdom. British multiculturalism must be understood in the context of a longer history of colonialism and immigration. The existence of multicultural cities may mean recognition of cultural difference but this is empty if not linked to debate about justice and equality.

## Why Do We Want Mixed-Income Housing and Neighborhoods?

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"Please, would you tell me," said Alice, a little timidly, . . . "why your cat grins like that?"

"It's a Cheshire cat," said the Duchess, "and that's why."

—Lewis Carroll

Whenever there is widespread agreement or consensus that a certain policy, or set of related policies, should be pursued and enacted, it becomes necessary to step back and ask, why? This is because once widespread agreement occurs, the theoretical premises that underlay the policies become lost—assumed away as the policy goals become self-evidently "good." But the "Why?" questions do not cease to be important; they are just asked less frequently. Why, that is, should we pursue the policies in question? What understandings of the current state of affairs and the potential change to them (after the policies are implemented) are required for us to think we should enact the policies?

In the past fifteen years there has emerged a consensus in the fields of urban studies and urban policy that mixed-income housing and neighborhoods (MI HN) are desirable. This consensus, which sits comfortably alongside its sibling paradigm of dispersal (see Goetz and Chapple Chapter 10, this volume), is deeply held among mainstream policy analysts, academics, and policymakers in Washington. When Henry Cisneros, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in the first Clinton Administration used to say, "the most serious problem we have in America today is the concentrations of our very poorest populations in specific neighborhoods" (quoted in Ramos 1994, 12), he was simply stating what has become "common sense" in urban studies. It is also, as is discussed here, an understanding rooted in theories of urban political economy that are themselves virtually paradigmatic in the field of urban studies.

In this chapter we discuss the recent sets of policies surrounding MI HN. We do not do so, however, with the goal of assessing particular policies or their implementation. Instead, we take a few steps back and we question the premises of these policies. We do so because we have consistently found ourselves attracted to the ideal, in theory, of MI HN—but we remain frustrated by the reality. This contradiction could be handled in different ways. We could, for instance, stand behind the veil of “imperfect practice,” as so many have done. Instead, however, we ask if maybe the recurring failure in practice is not simply a result of imperfect practice, but rather a result of flawed theoretical foundations. In short, we think that MI HN is being pursued for the wrong theoretical and normative reasons. And since they are being advocated for the wrong reasons, we should not be surprised when the policies fail to make our cities better places in which to live and work (which, it has to be said, is the measure by which all urban policies *should* be evaluated and discussed). As they currently exist, mixed-income housing policies are largely based on the (hegemonic) mantra that low-income people themselves are the problem, and that a benevolent gentry needs to colonize their home space in order to create the conditions necessary to help the poor “bootstrap” themselves into a better socioeconomic position.

The chapter proceeds in several steps. It begins with a discussion of the growth of MI HN, the causes of that growth, and the reasons for its popularity among mainstream policy analysts. It then discusses the policies that emerge from these justifications, and the problems associated with them—problems, that is, if the goal is something like social justice in our housing policies and in our neighborhoods. We argue that the problems that are evident in the policies are rooted in the theories behind them, and thus perfecting practice will still lead to unjust outcomes. From there, we explore alternative reasons for supporting MI HN—alternatives rooted in the history of urban social theory, and with explicit or implicit goals of making cities more just. We end with a preliminary discussion of what kinds of policies would follow from those theoretical starting points.

### Why Do Policymakers Like MI HN?

Although the reasons for promoting MI HN vary slightly in their content, they inevitably come back to the issue of helping the poor by having them live in proximity to the rich (or at least the middle class). Even the most thoughtful version of this, by Mark Joseph and his colleagues (Joseph 2007; Joseph, et al. 2007), begins with this premise.<sup>1</sup> Joseph, et al. identified the following four reasons why MI HN are being supported and promoted in public policy circles:

1. The improved social networks/social capital of the poor people that live in MI HN.
2. The increased social control and improved social organization the poor will have if living near middle- and upper-class people.
3. The influence of middle-class and wealthy people on the behavior of the poor—in terms of presenting role models for the poor.
4. The improved services and goods available to the poor once upper-income people live nearby (the *political economy of place*).

The first of these four has its roots in Putnam's understanding of social capital. The thinking being that poor people lack social capital and placing them in proximity to the wealthy will increase the quality and quantity of their social networks, thereby enabling them to improve their incomes and quality of life. The second and third have their roots in Wilson's “underclass” perspective and Lewis' “culture of poverty”—the distinction between the two (Wilson and Lewis) being increasingly irrelevant from the point of view of policy. This is the idea that, as Brophy and Smith (1997, 6) bluntly put it, “physical concentration of poor households in multifamily projects causes severe problems for the residents, including joblessness, drug abuse, and welfare dependency . . . a mixture of income levels will reduce the social pathology caused by concentration.” Finally, the last reason, *the political economy of place*, is rooted in the recognition that public services and the goods of collective consumption are better provided in middle-class and wealthy neighborhoods than in poor ones.

Joseph, et al. provide a thorough analysis of the empirical support—or lack thereof—for these four suppositions about MI HN, and thus it is not necessary to do so here. But there are a few things to discuss before we can proceed. First, there is actually little empirical evidence to support the first three reasons, and only some to support the fourth. Thus, the consensus, when pressed, seems to rely, as Schwartz and Tajbakhsh (1997, 81) put it, “largely on faith and on dissatisfaction with the previous thrust of low-income housing policy.” Second, there is a fundamental confusion about space and society. The recognition that the spatial concentration of poverty may, in many cases, lead to a worsening set of experiences of poverty, is not at all the same thing as saying that spatial concentration causes poverty. But what has occurred is that MI HN, either through dispersal or redevelopment strategies, has used space to displace the issue of poverty (sometimes literally as well as figuratively).<sup>2</sup>

Finally, and most important to us here, implicit in these understandings is the assumption—always unstated—that middle-class or wealthy people do not have anything to gain from the proximity of poor people (although probably unstated because it simply does not occur to people, rather than for political expediency). Poor people, in much of this language, come to be simply “a problem” that we need to spread out—and the language of “fair share” or “regional equity” that is often heard sounds remarkably similar to how people involved in environmental justice movements talk about things like waste transfer stations or incinerators.

Of course, there are other reasons why MI HN are being promoted, most often to revalorize disinvested neighborhoods. This usually comes with some displacement/dispersal of the poor—whether it is public sector led, in the context of HOPE VI and Section 8 voucherization, or private sector-led gentrification—or both simultaneously (see Wyly and Hammel 1999). That is, poor people in many cities are concentrated in places that, with capital reinvestment, can be gentrified and made middle or upper class. The striking thing about this perspective is that, like “the poor people benefit” perspectives, it is predicated on the assumption that poor people themselves bring nothing to the equation. The place that they happen to occupy may have become a potential focal point for the reproduction of capital. But the presence of poor people is largely beside the point. The place’s revalorization has everything to do with the larger-scale political economic forces of urbanization, and virtually nothing to do with the people who happen to reside there. It is striking that when places are poor and marginal to capital the causal reasons given for the poverty of those places center on the characteristics of the poor people who reside there. But when the places become destinations for capital reinvestment the (poor) people who already reside there play absolutely no part in that explanation.

Thus, we have a situation in which the dominant understanding of housing policy says and believes that poor people offer nothing to the rest of society. And if so, let us at least say that out loud that poor people are, in a literal sense, worthless.<sup>3</sup>

#### What Are the Policies That Emerge From These Understandings?

A variety of public policies have emerged from these understandings of the relationship between poor people and places being mapped and understood as poverty stricken. We highlight four here, two fairly large policies, a third that is a well-known but tiny pilot project, and a fourth that is not a policy per se, but rather a set of policies. These are voucherization, HOPE VI,

Moving To Opportunity (MTO), and the promotion of gentrification. All have been grafted onto an understanding of poverty that stresses the benefits poor people will experience if they are separated, dispersed, and assimilated into the mainstream of American existence (and perhaps, resocialized). We briefly review these four policies, which seek to send the poor into middle-income neighborhoods, and those that aim to move higher socioeconomic status (SES) households in impoverished neighborhoods/developments.

First, since the early 1970s, and increasingly since the early 1990s, there has been a decided shift in the form that federally subsidized housing takes, and that shift has been away from the project-based subsidized stock and toward the voucherization of subsidized housing. Although vouchers (formerly called Section 8 vouchers or certificates, now called Housing Choice Vouchers) were not originally meant to promote MI HN, they have become strongly associated with this goal, and therefore they have grown in support among mainstream housing policy analysts. As the project-based subsidized stock—the older Sections 221(d)3s or 236s, and the newer project-based Section 8s—opt out of the affordable housing programs and convert to market, the tenants within them receive vouchers that they can use *in situ* or can take with them wherever they decide to live. This slow drip of the conversion of housing from project-based to vouchers has not received the attention of the more dramatic demolitions associated with HOPE VI, but has affected far more affordable housing units, as roughly 250,000 units have been lost, with most converting the tenants to vouchers (see DeFilippis and Wyly 2008). Most policymakers and analysts view this as desirable because the project-based stock is fixed in place, and therefore concentrates poverty, whereas vouchers enable mobility and thereby, theoretically at least, promote the mixing of incomes because low-income people are assumed to want to flee their neighborhoods.

Second, HOPE VI may be viewed as simultaneously a poverty-dispersal program as well as a placed-based revitalization effort (see Goetz and Chapple Chapter 10, this volume). The specific dimensions of HOPE VI have been outlined in numerous studies, but one of its central goals is to create physical and social environmental conditions that will enable those defined as lower-income to pull themselves up from poverty into a higher SES and experience an increased quality of life as it relates to the places they live (see Joseph 2007, for an excellent overview of HOPE VI stated underpinnings and goals). Although many critics of HOPE VI show that the absolute numbers of subsidized housing units in these developments decrease in comparison to the preexisting public housing development on which they were built, other studies demonstrated that MI HN has not produced the intended economic or quality-of-life benefits even for those who have been able to relocate into the completed HOPE VI develop-

ments (Fraser and Nelson 2008; Joseph 2007). Joseph suggests that there is a “need to lower expectations” for what HOPE VI might accomplish for lower-income populations because the conceptual underpinnings and routes low-income people might use to achieve their goals in the context of HOPE VI are either underspecified or not operating as conceived. We add that this current state of affairs may be due to an underappreciation of the relationships among home, neighborhood, and work. For example, although HOPE VI-inspired improvements in housing stock, architectural design, and aesthetics are seemingly desirable, public housing authorities, social service providers, and even HOPE VI communities all operate in the context of social forces—such as the production of labor markets and public policy—which are beyond their grasp.

Third, MTO has generated significant attention among academics and policymakers—attention far beyond what is suggested by the experimental program’s incredibly modest size of less than five thousand people in just five cities (see Goetz and Chapple Chapter 10, this volume). The program/experiment placed people from project-based subsidized properties into one of three groups: (a) a group that simply stayed where they were; (b) a group that received vouchers that could only be used in low-poverty neighborhoods, and; (c) a group that received regular Section 8 vouchers. The experiment produced ambiguous results (see Goering and Feins 2003), with households that moved to low-poverty neighborhoods feeling safer in their neighborhoods, and therefore somewhat happier about the neighborhoods, but otherwise not displaying much impact in the fields of health, mental health, employment, earnings, education, crime, or most other issues.

Fourth, whether or not policymakers, public officials, or private-sector supporters of MI HN explicitly endorse gentrification as a potential outcome of MI HN implementation, the reality is that the creation of desirable housing markets can have that effect. Goetz (2003, 70), as an example, notes that “private investors are now bidding up property values in the vicinity of public housing projects,” as a way to accrue profit from speculative increases in land rent. Neil Smith (2002) notes that gentrification is a general strategy engaged by public and private sectors to revitalize their cities to be competitive places for other forms of economic investment. The confluence of housing policy and broader urban economic development strategies tends to promote place as an amenity for new economy workers (i.e., those with more disposable income). What is remarkable about this trend is not that developers have pushed for new markets to invest their capital, but rather that public policy, via academia (Florida 2005), has fostered this sense of creating a common good that, like the Reagan years, promises to trickle down to those in the most vulnerable position but rarely does. Although some observers demonstrated that HOPE VI-styled MI HN pushed people

out of their home spaces for the more capitalized members of society, the parallel non-HOPE VI—public-private ventures to reclaim low-income neighborhoods for higher SES populations—simply devastate opportunities for those who are less privileged (Fraser and Kick 2007).

Taken together, all four public policies, or sets of policies, that promote MI HN focus on a conception of poverty that chooses to focus on surface appearances that intuitively suggests “anything is better even for these poor people.” Although this may be based on an implicit understanding of the harshness of living in hyper-segregated poverty, the conceptual premise that MI HN will operate to smooth inequities between raced, gendered, and classed populations is certainly “a grin without a cat.” That is, there is dis-sociation with preexisting and unequal opportunity structures that operate in a society based on *laissez-faire* capitalism.

### Problems With These Policies

When examining the problems with these policies, a central issue is that these programs do not produce their hypothesized results and there is little evidence that the expected benefits will be realized. Simply put, poor people do not seem to benefit much from MI HN. It should be noted that the one theorized benefit that actually appears to have some empirical basis is that of the “political economy of place”—but to look at this benefit and therefore argue that we *should* do MI HN, is a remarkable way of talking about what should be done. This perspective starts with the recognition of an unjust situation (that the quality and distribution of public goods and services is based on the class of the people receiving those services), and, instead of saying that what we *should* do is rectify the injustice, it assumes the immutability of that injustice. It then suggests that moving people around urban areas and promoting mixes of income distribution is commensurate with opening opportunity structures to people in poverty.

The failure of MI HN to improve life for poor people is not particularly difficult to understand. There are several reasons that seem clear to us. These policies—particularly those that promote mobility—often leave poor people in places without the social networks and informal social support of prior neighborhoods. Similarly, such mobility-based policies often leave poor people without the institutional services and support of their prior neighborhoods, and locates them in new places that lack the institutional capacity to provide those services (Goetz and Chapple Chapter 10, this volume).<sup>4</sup> Finally, mixed-income policies also have failed to create social mixing, networks, and interaction—that is, social capital. This is because the MI HN leave the larger social cleavages unaltered. For example, HOPE VI developments—and the

organizations that govern them—typically sort people based on subsidized versus market rate status. Similarly, in non-HOPE VI mixed-income neighborhoods, the ability to achieve homeowner status articulates a resident as having automatic rights to the city—that is the right to participate in the creation of the rules of conduct and to enforce them—whereas renters' rights have typically been marginalized. In both scenarios, social sorting occurs based on classed, and in many cases, raced and gendered identities. Finally, such policies often are self-defeating because poor people (especially those with vouchers) often reconcentrate in new places. This is for two primary reasons. First, there is the willful behavior of people trying to recreate former communities and social ties in new physical spaces; and second, even with vouchers up to 110 percent of Fair Market Rent, the market, as the allocator of housing, has tendencies toward segregating people along race and class lines.<sup>5</sup>

#### Why Do We Like MI HN?

Although the reasons usually given in contemporary public policy circles for the promotion of MI HN are relatively new, the goal itself is not. People with dreams of better cities and towns (e.g., Ebenezer Howard, Patrick Geddes, and Lewis Mumford); or people involved in efforts to improve the cities we have already (e.g., Jane Addams); or people celebrating, and protecting, some of the best of currently existing cities (e.g., Jane Jacobs) have long discussed the benefits of MI HN. Howard, Geddes, and Mumford embraced social integration as part of their broad and deep sympathies to the utopian anarchist tradition—a tradition that included the mixing of all classes and activities into cities and towns, with the land being worked and owned in common (see Hall 2002). Addams (1910) followed a different line of reasoning, and argued that the social integration of people would lead to the upper classes learning about life by being exposed to the poor. Finally, Jacobs rather famously embraced the integration of different peoples, activities, and uses of urban space. Our intellectual and political lineage, in our support for MI HN, is not with Oscar Lewis and William Julius Wilson, but with the anarchist utopian planners, the more critically minded of the settlement house movement leaders, and—a bit—with Jacobs.

The problem, however, is that the reasons why MI HN is appealing to us are perhaps better expressed in the negative than in the positive. That is, it is easier for us to see what is wrong with class-based segregation than to convincingly affirm the transcendence of those problems through the processes of integration. But we're getting a bit ahead of ourselves. There are, we think, several reasons why class-based segregation is a barrier to realizing more just cities and processes of urbanization.<sup>6</sup>

First, class-segregated neighborhoods and towns lead to class-segregated public spaces—the rich and poor, simply put, do not interact or even see each other in the public spaces where they gather. And although the specific relationships between public space, the public sphere, and public policy remain issues for debate (see, e.g., Calhoun 1992; Mitchell 2003), it is certainly true that people at least partially come to understand who and what constitutes “the public” by who and what they encounter and interact with once they leave the realm of the private (i.e., their homes and their cars). The second problem stems from the first: Without integrated public spaces, the wealthy are enabled to continue to believe that they are “middle class,” or, similarly, that the United States is a “class-free” society. Lives lived in exclusionary isolation—especially those so often represented in the media as normal—become naturalized, and their particular qualities made invisible to those who live them. Third, the goods and processes of social reproduction, that is, schools, hospitals, and other health care facilities, child care, and so on, also become segregated when there is class-based segregation, which in turn undermines the political will and capacity to support funding for such efforts beyond the immediate realm of individual neighborhoods. This, in short, is one of the reasons why the political economy of place rationale for MI HN has some empirical support. Finally, class-based segregation is a fundamental barrier to urban democracy and social justice. This is simply because democracy (urban or otherwise) requires at least a tacit acceptance that there is a shared fate and future within society (see Williamson Chapter 11, this volume). We need not embrace Aristotelian republicanism (which we do not, by any means, do) to think that democracy requires recognition of the existence of a mutually shared society. Such understandings of a shared fate in society also benefit a great deal from unmediated interactions that are most likely to occur in shared spaces.

#### But Is Space the Problem—Or the Solution?

The problem with the previous discussion, however, is that although segregation is a barrier to social justice, it does not necessarily follow that integration (by itself) is a solution. Space, it seems, more easily can be part of the problem than part of the solution. Being in close proximity need not engender interaction, and when it does, that interaction may mean conflict as much as anything else (see Spinner-Halev Chapter 7, this volume). It is, in short, unclear whether or not the physical proximity of the rich and poor will lead to the rich even acknowledging, let alone understanding or trying to understand, the poor. There is what we call the “The Agatha Christie problem.” We call it that because there is a reason why the butler could

always be the murderer in cozy British murder mysteries: The butler was always completely invisible to everybody else in the room. He shared the most intimate spaces with people, and yet was never seen by those people. Similarly, and not hypothetically, the re-emergence of large numbers of homeless people in the streets and parks of New York City led more to New Yorkers developing a capacity to see past homelessness than it did to interactions, dialogue, or understanding between the housed and nonhoused in the city's streets. Proximity also can lead more to conflict than any other outcome. This was certainly the case in Paris in the nineteenth century, which was marked by repeated uprisings by the urban poor and working class. They fought with the bourgeoisie who lived nearby—or at least did so until Haussmann forcibly removed the poor and working class from the center of the city. In both outcomes—invisibility and conflict—proximity without larger changes in the political economy is clearly woefully inadequate as a way to try to realize social justice (or even improve the condition of the poor).

Those who live in mixed-income environments do not escape the reality that “communities” are raced, classed, and gendered. These identities have a long history of being made important in larger society and play out in the workings of mixed-income neighborhoods. The criteria that are implemented on a daily basis to distinguish those who have legitimate claims to the “right to the city” (to inhabit and create urban space) usually undercut subsidized renters in obvious ways (i.e., drug tests, mandatory house-cleaning courses, checks on employment status). How can we not expect those practices to bleed into the social relations between proximate residents and their unequal sense of the right to be in place? This is because the key issue remains the unequal power relations involved in people's access to the space—people's ability, in short, to claim a right to be in the place (or, more broadly, a right to the city). For mixing to have a role in making our cities more just, the people being mixed need to be in proximity on their own terms and those terms need some level of equivalence or comparability. And this is simply not true for the policies that currently promote MI HN.

This last point leads directly to the problem of “community” in MI HN. And here we depart from most all critiques of mixed-income housing policy, because virtually none have taken into account the very notion of “community.” Although community is largely romanticized as a positive force that enables individuals and households to foster connections that serve to expand and deepen group- and individual-level opportunity structures, it also is a social force that its members experience differentially. Mixed-income housing developments/neighborhoods, by definition, are comprised of residents who have preexisting and differential sets of economic, cultural, and social capital (Bourdieu, 1986). If these qualities act as mediating structures that position people in their everyday experiences with their neighbors as well as

public and private entities that insert themselves into neighborhood affairs, then very real power differentials will exist in mixed-income locales.

This is no different when we talk about building community in mixed-income environments because the ability to have one's needs and desires represented (politics of representation) in the creation of communal processes and social norms is inextricably tied to who has rights to space, what forms of surveillance and governance will be promoted and tolerated, and what resources will be made available to them. Moreover, when “community” and the guiding principles of place do not work for some residents, then the forms of capital listed here become extremely important. Here, consider cultural capital—the stock of experiences, knowledge, and networks of affiliation (Bourdieu 1986). It provides some residents the ability to act swiftly and deftly when bringing extra-neighborhood resources to bear on neighborhood affairs.

### On the Use of MI HN for Social Justice

So, the question becomes how can forms of community in MI HN—and their associated processes—be created to smooth power differentials between groups marked by income and wealth differentials? The answers are elusively simple yet procedurally difficult. First, community and other processes of neighborhood governance must always exist in a state of *becoming*. Because community only can be understood in its articulation with other phenomena such as labor conditions, housing markets, educational opportunities, race, class, gender—and the list goes on ad infinitum—then community and its organizations/institutional manifestations must be constantly critiqued, contested, and renegotiated if it is to respond effectively to the context within which it operates. Mitchell (2003) rightly contends that in order for democracy to flourish as well as the creation of a socially just society, public spaces are crucial sites within which the people may lay claim to a politics of representation. In MI HN settings this is a poignant call for all residents to be able to create the rules of conduct and to respond effectively to the fact that differently “incomed” groups of residents are going to have overlapping desires but also distinct agendas that need to be addressed (see Massey 2005, on “spatial co-presence”).

The second set of strategies to produce a vibrant and responsive MI HN revolve around smoothing inequities experienced by low-income residents through actual wealth-accumulation policies. For example, in the wake of the mortgage and foreclosure crisis that has inordinately affected lower-income populations, some housing scholars are thinking about reviving social housing. In the context of MI HN development, shared-equity housing strategies

such as community land trusts, limited-equity co-ops, and deed-restricted housing could be employed to move people into low-risk, mixed-income housing (see J. Davis 2006, for a thorough discussion of "shared-equity homeownership"). This would additionally serve to mediate the pernicious marking of some residents as being marginal community members based on, once again, the tacit assumption that low-income individuals have less to offer than those who can make a larger economic investment in place. By engaging in strategies such as these, we believe that new opportunities might be opened where social mixing might produce some of the building blocks to create real opportunities for low-income residents to actually take part in *creating* their own opportunity structures rather than relying on the benevolence of more privileged neighbors.

### Conclusion

We have argued that MI HN—as it is currently understood theoretically and put into practice by policies—is fundamentally flawed and will not result in improving conditions for people—rich or poor—in U.S. cities. The assumptions made in the first instance, that the policies are only there to benefit the poor because the poor bring nothing to communities, is reproduced and amplified when put in practice. On the one hand, the assumption drives the dismantling of low-income communities (because they contribute nothing anyway), and on the other hand it enables the incredible uneven power relations between groups when they are living together.

Instead, we are advocating forms of MI HN that mitigate the power relations between groups—while also recognizing that such power relations extend well beyond any given community or place. Because such power relations extend beyond any community or place, and because poverty is inherently interrelated with labor markets and their operations, perhaps we should call into question the capacity of particular forms of housing or specific housing developments to alleviate poverty. But that does not mean that we should give up on MI HN specifically, or housing-centered interventions more generally. Instead it means that we need to have realistic expectations of what MI HN can do for poor people. Even so, only specific kinds of MI HN can really benefit poor people. The best we can do is to create forms of governance that are more equitable within such developments, and forms of property ownership in which wealth is limited and community-based governance is the rule. In short, if poverty is produced and experienced as a set of material and cultural forces and unequal power relations, then we need to build forms of housing that limit the experiences of poverty in such developments.

These are certainly imperfect and limited interventions in the face of the structured inequities and injustices in U.S. cities. But they offer ways for us to address the problems of spatial segregation by creating forms of integrated neighborhoods that are not simply about the space of housing—but rather its governance and the wealth it generates. Ultimately, these relations are at the heart of all struggles for social justice.

### Notes

1. In fairness to Joseph and his colleagues, they said their goal was to recount the stated reasons for the support for MI HN. They were not necessarily taking ownership for any of those reasons.
2. We are grateful to Elvin Wyly (personal communication) for making this point strongly, and that has certainly shaped our thinking about this.
3. They can potentially serve as a reserve army of labor that mediate capital-labor relations for the benefit of keeping wages down. Extrapolating from this perspective, urban planning is used as a form of social control as many problems of contemporary society have been "consigned to the inner cities and [in the European context of social housing] peripheral estates (Cochrane, cited in Bridge and Watson 2002, 534).
4. Despite assumptions to the contrary, poor urban neighborhoods have dense networks of social support that have been created largely out of necessity because services that are commodities in wealthy neighborhoods (e.g., child care) must be negotiated as noncommodified when participants do not have money. Empirical studies have found that relocated public housing residents have a difficult time rebuilding social networks (Clampet-Lundquist 2004a), leading to higher degrees of social isolation for children as well as adults in many situations (Curley 2005; Gibson 2007; Goetz 2003). Fraser and Kick (2007), in their study of a HOPE VI project in Durham, North Carolina, found that those residents relocated into other public housing developments not only faced the challenge of building social networks, but did so in the context of harsh environmental conditions (as measured by a longitudinal, spatial cluster analysis of violent crime and Urban Institute survey data reporting decreased levels of safety by residents).
5. These are all problems that come directly from the theoretical assumptions and understandings that inform the particular policies. These are not problems that emerge from "imperfect implementation" as many studies imply, for example, which conclude with such statements as: "Our data point out areas where performance improvements appear urgent and, in addition, there remain some important knowledge gaps that must be overcome before HOPE VI relocation practice can be fully assessed" (Kingsley, et al. 2003); and, "While acknowledging the HOPE VI program's important successes, it is also necessary to recognize where the program needs to be improved" (Popkin, et al. 2004).
6. We should acknowledge at the beginning of this discussion that Young (2000) played an important role in our thinking through these issues.